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1 Introduction 
 
The relationship between the National Credit Act 34 of 20051 and the Insolvency Act 
24 of 19362 has been the subject of discussion in three academic pieces published 
in successive volumes of this journal in the last three years.3 These concerned the 
judgments in Ex parte Ford and Two Similar Cases,4 Investec Bank Ltd v Mutemeri5 
and Naidoo v ABSA Bank Ltd.6 Since then, the interaction between statutory 
provisions relating to debt review in terms of the NCA and sequestration in terms of 
the Insolvency Act has demanded the attention of the high court in at least three 
more judgments. These are Nedbank v Andrews,7 FirstRand Bank Ltd v Evans8 and, 
most recently, FirstRand Bank Ltd v Janse van Rensburg.9  
 
The question raised in all three of the recent cases was whether or not a debtor's 
application for debt review in terms of the NCA constitutes an "act of insolvency" in 
                                            
   Lienne Steyn. BA LLB (UN) LLM (Unisa) LLD (UP). Associate Professor, School of Law, 
University of KwaZulu-Natal (steyn@ukzn.ac.za). Portions of the text of this case analysis have 
been reproduced from the author's LLD-thesis manuscript. See Steyn Statutory Regulation of 
Forced Sale of the Home in South Africa (LLD – thesis UP 2012). 
1   Hereafter referred to as the "NCA". 
2   Hereafter referred to as the "Insolvency Act". 
3   See Van Heerden and Boraine 2009 PELJ 22; Boraine and Van Heerden 2010 PELJ 84; and 
Maghembe 2011 PELJ 171. 
4  Ex parte Ford and Two Similar Cases 2009 3 SA 376 (WCC), hereafter referred to as "Ex parte 
Ford". 
5  Investec Bank Ltd v Mutemeri 2010 1 SA 265 (GSJ), hereafter referred to as "Investec v 
Mutemeri". 
6  Naidoo v ABSA Bank Ltd 2010 4 SA 597 (SCA), hereafter referred to as "Naidoo v ABSA". 
7   Nedbank v Andrews (240/2011) 2011 ZAECPEHC 29 (10 May 2011), hereafter referred to as 
"Nedbank v Andrews". 
8   FirstRand Bank Ltd v Evans 2011 4 597 (KZD), hereafter referred to as "FirstRand Bank Ltd v 
Evans". 
9   FirstRand Bank Ltd v Janse van Rensburg 2012 2 All SA 186 (ECP), hereafter referred to as 
"FirstRand Bank v Janse van Rensburg". 
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terms of section 8 of the Insolvency Act, upon which a creditor may rely in an 
application for the compulsory sequestration of the debtor's estate. If it does, it would 
mean that by resorting to the debt relief measures provided by the NCA a debtor 
commits the very act on which a creditor may base an application for a sequestration 
order that, if granted, will render his estate insolvent and bring about the liquidation 
of his assets. From the debtor's perspective, this is most probably precisely the 
situation that he endeavours to avert by applying for debt review. Further, 
sequestration would frustrate the stated purpose of the NCA, which is that debtors 
should take responsibility for their debts by satisfying them in full10 and concurrent 
creditors might ultimately receive a dividend that falls far short of what they are due. 
The debt relief measures introduced by the NCA may be regarded, in a sense, as 
posing alternatives to sequestration in terms of the Insolvency Act. The question may 
be raised whether a debtor's reaching out to the NCA's "lifeline" may, or should, be 
the very act that triggers his estate's sequestration and its attendant consequences.  
 
In each set of circumstances in Nedbank v Andrews, FirstRand Bank v Evans and 
FirstRand Bank v Janse van Rensburg, the court dealt with the issue somewhat 
differently. It is submitted that this is an important issue, the treatment of which 
impacts significantly on the efficacy of the South African consumer debt relief system 
and which therefore merits further discussion. 
 
2 Background 
 
The sequence of developments began with Ex parte Ford, in which the court refused 
applications by three debtors for the voluntary surrender of their estates. The reason 
that the applications were dismissed was that the court regarded an application for 
debt review in terms of the NCA as the more appropriate route for each over-
indebted debtor to follow. Van Heerden and Boraine, in an article entitled "The 
interaction between the debt relief measures in the National Credit Act 34 of 2005 
and aspects of insolvency law",11 provided an insightful and comprehensive analysis 
of the position in relation to the consumer debt relief measures provided by the NCA 
and their interaction with the provisions of the Insolvency Act. While the primary 
                                            
10   See s 3 NCA. 
11   Van Heerden and Boraine 2009 PELJ 22. 
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focus in Ex parte Ford was the voluntary surrender procedure, Van Heerden and 
Boraine extended their discussion to the implications of the provisions of the NCA for 
compulsory sequestration applications and, almost prophetically, they anticipated 
what later occurred and was decided in Investec v Mutemeri, reported the following 
year. It may be noted at this juncture that Van Heerden and Boraine considered 
that:12 
 
a notice to a creditor that a consumer-debtor is bound to go for debt review may 
also amount to an act of insolvency, although the mere commission of an act of 
insolvency is not in itself sufficient to warrant the granting of a compulsory 
sequestration order.   
 
In Investec v Mutemeri, the high court held that an application for compulsory 
sequestration in terms of the Insolvency Act did not constitute "enforcement" of an 
agreement, as envisaged by sections 129 and 130 of the NCA. It held that it also did 
not constitute the "exercise or enforcement by litigation or other judicial process [of] 
any right or security" from which the creditor is barred once it has been notified, in 
terms of section 86(4)(b)(i) of the NCA, that the debtor has applied for debt review. 
Essentially, the effect of the decision is that, where a debtor has applied for debt 
review in terms of the NCA, this does not preclude a creditor from applying for the 
sequestration of the debtor's estate. Boraine and Van Heerden promptly followed up 
their initial article with a discussion of the position in the light of the decision in 
Investec v Mutemeri, in a second article entitled "To sequestrate or not to 
sequestrate in view of the National Credit Act 34 of 2005: a tale of two judgments".13 
The authors agreed with the reasoning behind the decision and the correctness in 
principle of the conclusion reached by the court that an application for sequestration 
does not amount to "a civil procedure or civil suit in the form of debt enforcement".14  
 
As they had done in their earlier article in relation to Ex parte Ford, Boraine and Van 
Heerden extrapolated from the facts in Investec v Mutemeri and, observing that "a 
debt situation is … not static", they explored ways in which the established precedent 
ought to be applied and the approach that ought to be adopted in various 
                                            
12   Van Heerden and Boraine 2009 PELJ 42 fn 78.  
13   Boraine and Van Heerden 2010 PELJ 84. 
14   Boraine and Van Heerden 2010 PELJ 116-117. 
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scenarios.15 They suggested that in appropriate circumstances the court might 
consider referring the matter for debt review, using the discretion afforded to it by 
section 85 of the NCA, before it exercised its discretion to grant a sequestration 
order in terms of the Insolvency Act. The authors anticipated that this might be an 
appropriate course for a court to adopt in an application for voluntary surrender in 
circumstances where it appeared that credit had been extended recklessly. They 
suggested that this could occur even where the applicant debtor had already 
undergone debt review, but where it transpired that the latter process had been 
defective in that, for example, the question of reckless lending had not been properly 
considered.16  
 
Boraine and Van Heerden further envisaged that a creditor might seek the 
sequestration of the estate of a debtor whose obligations arose mainly out of credit 
agreements and who had already undergone the debt review process. This might be 
the case where the creditor had rejected repayment terms proposed by the debtor, 
so that a "stale-mate" situation had arisen, or where an application lodged by the 
debt counsellor to the court was still pending, or even where the court had issued a 
debt restructuring order17 despite the creditor's opposition. The authors considered 
that in such circumstances there might be "hard facts" available on which the creditor 
could base its argument that sequestration of the debtor's estate would be 
preferable. These might include a situation where the creditor was able to show that 
the repayment period or the monthly repayment amount, according to the 
restructuring order, was not viable. It might also arise where the debtor had not 
included in the debt review all of his obligations arising out of credit agreements or 
where the debtor had stopped making payments after the issue of the court's debt 
rescheduling order or the filing of the voluntary rescheduling agreement between the 
parties.18 
 
                                            
15   Boraine and Van Heerden 2010 PELJ 117-120. 
16   Boraine and Van Heerden 2010 PELJ 119. 
17   The terms "debt restructuring", "debt re-arrangement" and "debt rescheduling" are used 
interchangeably in this work, as are the terms "restructure", "re-arrange" and "reschedule". The 
words "re-arrange" and "re-arrangement" are spelt thus in order to conform to the spelling 
employed in the NCA.  
18   Boraine and Van Heerden 2010 PELJ 120. 
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In Naidoo v ABSA, the Supreme Court of Appeal confirmed the correctness of the 
decision, in Investec v Mutemeri, that sequestration does not amount to legal 
proceedings to enforce an agreement, as envisaged by section 129 read with section 
130(3) of the NCA. The effect of the decision in Naidoo v ABSA is that, in an 
application by a creditor for the sequestration of a debtor's estate, the former is not 
required first to have issued a notice in terms of section 129(1)(a) of the NCA to the 
debtor. In a case analysis of Naidoo v ABSA entitled "The Appellate Division has 
spoken …"19 Maghembe agreed with the decision but expressed concern that the 
effect of sequestration to deprive a consumer debtor of the option of continuing with 
the debt review might impact adversely on "the efficiency of the NCA".20 Maghembe 
observed that through debt restructuring or a ruling in respect of reckless credit, or 
even simple negotiation between the parties, a debtor might be in a position to 
overcome his debt burden and to satisfy his financial obligations in full, which, as he 
pointed out, is one of the stated purposes of the NCA. What is more, a debtor could 
avoid a declaration of insolvency with the consequent loss of assets, the social 
stigma attached to the insolvency, and the fact of being rendered "a less than useful 
member of society". Maghembe submitted that a debtor should have the choice 
between insolvency and an alternative debt relief measure.21 He suggested that 
sections 88 and 129 of the NCA should be amended to preclude a creditor from 
applying for the compulsory sequestration of a debtor's estate after it has received a 
notice informing it that the debtor has applied for debt review in terms of section 
86(4)(b)(i), or that a matter has been referred by a court for debt review under 
section 83 or 85 of the NCA, or without first having issued a section 129 notice to the 
debtor.22      
 
The more recent judgments in Nedbank v Andrews, FirstRand Bank v Evans and 
FirstRand Bank v Janse van Rensburg concerned whether or not any of the various 
acts committed in an application for debt review, a debtor's notification to creditors 
that he has applied for debt review, the re-arrangement of a debtor's obligations, or 
the issue of a debt re-arrangement order in terms of the NCA, constitutes an "act of 
insolvency" in terms of section 8 of the Insolvency Act. These judgments and their 
                                            
19   Maghembe 2011 PELJ 171. 
20   Maghembe 2011 PELJ 177-178. 
21   Maghembe 2011 PELJ 178. 
22   Maghembe 2011 PELJ 178-179. 
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general implications for the efficacy of consumer debt relief measures that are 
available in South Africa are considered below. 
 
3 Nedbank v Andrews    
 
In Nedbank v Andrews it was common cause that Andrews was indebted to 
Nedbank in the amounts of R972 065.37 in respect of a loan agreement, R168 
418.38 in respect of a suretyship agreement, R39 391.40 in respect of a credit card 
facility, and R8 125.63 in respect of an overdraft facility on his current account. 
These obligations had been re-arranged in terms of section 87 of the NCA.23  
Nedbank initially brought applications for the sequestration of the estates of both 
Andrews and his wife, to whom he was married out of community of property.24 
However, Nedbank later withdrew the application against his wife. Andrews opposed 
the application for the sequestration of his estate.25 
 
In its founding papers Nedbank sought to rely on three grounds for the sequestration 
of Andrews' estate. These were: an alleged act of insolvency in terms of section 8(g) 
of the Insolvency Act;26 an alleged act of insolvency in terms of section 8(e) of the 
Insolvency Act;27 and an allegation of his actual insolvency in that his liabilities, fairly 
estimated, exceeded the value of his assets.28 However, in court, counsel for the 
applicant withdrew the allegations of the commission of the acts of insolvency and 
sought to rely solely on the actual insolvency of Andrews. In its judgment, the court, 
per Nepgen J, nevertheless considered it necessary to refer to the alleged acts of 
insolvency in the context of the allegations of actual insolvency put forward on behalf 
of the applicant.29 Nedbank had initially contended that Andrews had committed an 
act of insolvency in terms of section 8(g) of the Insolvency Act in that by applying for 
                                            
23   Nedbank v Andrews para 2.  
24   It may be noted that Andrews and his wife were jointly and severally liable for repayment of the 
amount of R972 065.37 in respect of the loan agreement. 
25   Nedbank v Andrews para 1. 
26   In terms of s 8(g) of the Insolvency Act, "[a] debtor commits an act of insolvency if he gives notice 
in writing to any one of his creditors that he is unable to pay any of his debts".     
27   In terms of s 8(e) of the Insolvency Act, "[a] debtor commits an act of insolvency if he makes or 
offers to make any arrangement with any of his creditors for releasing him wholly or partially from 
his debts". 
28   Nedbank v Andrews para 10, with reference to Ohlsson's Cape Breweries Ltd v Totten 1911 TPD 
48 50. 
29   Nedbank v Andrews para 3. 
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and being placed under debt review he gave notice in writing to the applicant and 
other creditors that he was unable to pay his debts. It had contended further that the 
re-arrangement of his debts, which occurred in the debt review process, constituted 
an act of insolvency envisaged in section 8(e) of the Insolvency Act.30    
 
Andrews had responded to the allegations contained in the founding papers by 
contending that Nedbank was not entitled to rely on the proceedings conducted in 
terms of the NCA as constituting acts of insolvency for the purposes of the 
Insolvency Act. Andrews also raised the point that Nedbank had participated in the 
debt review and that it had unsuccessfully applied for the rescission of the debt re-
arrangement order. However, in view of the fact that Nedbank had withdrawn its 
allegations of the commission of acts of insolvency and was relying solely on the 
actual insolvency of Andrews, the court did not deal in more detail with the issues 
raised by Andrews in this regard.31  As far as the allegation of actual insolvency was 
concerned, the court found that Nedbank had not established that Andrews' liabilities 
exceeded his assets and it dismissed the application for sequestration of his 
estate.32           
 
4 FirstRand Bank v Evans  
 
4.1 The facts and the issues 
 
FirstRand Bank v Evans concerned an application for the provisional sequestration 
of the estate of Evans. The bank alleged that he was indebted to it in an amount in 
excess of R2 million obtained as a loan secured by two mortgage bonds passed over 
his home as well as an amount in the region of R800 000 obtained as a commercial 
loan secured by a mortgage bond passed over another immovable property, a 
sectional title unit. FirstRand Bank relied on the commission by Evans of an act of 
insolvency in terms of section 8(g) of the Insolvency Act by giving written notice of an 
inability to pay his debts and, alternatively, that he was actually insolvent. According 
to the judgment, on 29 January 2009, Evans had applied for debt review in terms of 
                                            
30   Nedbank v Andrews para 4. 
31   Nedbank v Andrews para 5. 
32   Nedbank v Andrews paras 10-11. 
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section 86 of the NCA and the bank had been advised of this.33 On 17 April 2009 he 
had addressed a letter to the bank informing it that: its records should show that he 
was under debt review; the mortgage bond repayment was being renegotiated and 
would be administered through the courts; and he was terminating the debit order 
against his bank account for the monthly instalment in respect of the commercial 
loan. The bank relied on this letter as constituting the alleged act of insolvency.  
 
On 18 May 2009 FirstRand Bank issued notice that it was terminating the debt 
review in terms of section 86(10) of the NCA.34 On 16 July 2009 it issued summons 
against Evans for payment of an amount slightly in excess of R2 million, which was 
secured by the two mortgage bonds passed over his home. On 18 August 2009 the 
bank obtained default judgment and, presumably, an order declaring executable his 
immovable property.35 Evans first heard of this when on 12 March 2010 the sheriff 
served a notice of attachment at his residence informing him that a sale in execution 
of his home would take place on 28 May 2010.36 It transpired that the summons had 
been served at the incorrect address. On 8 April 2010 the bank initiated the 
application for the sequestration of Evans' estate based on both the judgment and an 
alleged amount of R841 940 owing at that point in time in respect of their loan 
agreement. The sequestration application made no mention of the attachment order 
or the sale in execution.37 
 
Evans opposed the application for the sequestration of his estate. He furnished the 
following information to the court. An application for the re-arrangement of his debt 
had been issued in the Durban Magistrate's Court on 3 July 2009 and an order was 
made on 24 July 2009.38 He provided details of regular monthly payments from 28 
                                            
33   FirstRand Bank Ltd v Evans para 3. 
34   It should be borne in mind that this occurred prior to the decision of the Supreme Court of Appeal 
in Collett v FirstRand Bank Ltd and Another 2011 4 SA 508 (SCA), in which the effect of the 
termination of debt review was settled. 
35   This is not specifically stated in the judgment. 
36   FirstRand Bank Ltd v Evans para 4. 
37   FirstRand Bank Ltd v Evans para 5. 
38   This is the way in which it is expressed in the judgment, at para 6. It is not clear, it is submitted, 
what is meant when it is stated that an application for the re-arrangement of debt was "issued" in 
the magistrate's court. Perhaps this means that it had taken from 29 January 2009 until 3 July 
2009 for the debt review application to be enrolled in the magistrate's court? In relation to the 
debt re-arrangement order, see also paras 10, 33, 34, 36, and 37. It may be noted that, although 
the judgment is not clear on the details concerning it, the court doubted the existence and validity 
of the debt re-arrangement order. This point is discussed further below.   
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August 2009 to 29 April 2010 in respect of the two mortgage bonds and the loan 
agreement in compliance with the debt re-arrangement order. In a letter to the bank's 
attorneys, Evans' attorneys had stated: "We cannot understand your client's 
persistence in prosecuting its claim against our client. In this regard we also refer to 
the ill-conceived sequestration application …"39 Thereafter Evans' attorneys had 
launched an urgent application to stay the sale in execution and to seek rescission of 
judgment, and they filed an opposing affidavit in the sequestration application. The 
bank contended in a replying affidavit that the NCA was not a bar to an application 
for sequestration of the estate of the debtor and that, in any event, it had terminated 
the debt review. The bank also made the point that the amounts payable to it in 
terms of the debt re-arrangement order were insufficient to service the loans as the 
amount of interest due monthly exceeded the amount payable in terms of the order 
by an amount of about R4 000. The court noted that discrepancies in the figures 
presented by Evans in relation to his income and expenditure were impossible to 
reconcile.40  
 
In October 2010 Evans informed the bank that he had sold the sectional title unit for 
an amount of R800 000 in excess of the value attributed to it by the bank.41 By the 
time that the sequestration application was heard in February 2011, the default 
judgment had been rescinded by consent,42 the sectional title property had been 
transferred after cancellation of the mortgage bond passed over it, and the proceeds 
of the sale – an  amount of R1 260 208,64 – had been paid to the bank. The 
proceeds had fully discharged the amount that had been owed to the bank in respect 
of the commercial loan agreement and the excess had been credited to Evans' loan 
indebtedness, which was secured by the two mortgage bonds over his home. 
Although there was some dispute in relation to the amount that ought to have been 
credited to his account, FirstRand Bank did not challenge Evans' claim that in the 
circumstances he could repay the interest and capital within less than the sixteen 
years that remained of the original 20-year term of the mortgage bond.43 In spite of 
this, FirstRand Bank persisted in its application for the sequestration of his estate. It 
                                            
39   FirstRand Bank Ltd v Evans para 6. 
40   FirstRand Bank Ltd v Evans para 7. 
41   FirstRand Bank Ltd v Evans para 8. 
42   FirstRand Bank Ltd v Evans paras 6, 9. 
43   FirstRand Bank Ltd v Evans para 10. 
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was argued on behalf of Evans that the NCA precluded such an application. 
Applying the reasoning in the decisions in Investec v Mutemeri and Naidoo v ABSA, 
the court rejected this argument. It was also contended on behalf of Evans that his 
letter did not constitute an act of insolvency but that in the event that the court did not 
accept this argument it should exercise its discretion in favour of Evans by refusing 
to grant the order.44 
 
4.2 The decision 
 
The court, per Wallis J, as he then was, stated at the outset that the purpose of a 
debtor's applying for debt review in terms of section 86(1) of the NCA is always to 
obtain a declaration that he is over-indebted. Therefore, the court reasoned, "a 
debtor who informs his creditor that he has applied for, or is under, debt review is 
necessarily informing the creditor that he is over-indebted and unable to pay his 
debts".45 The court considered the lapse of a period of almost a year between the 
date on which the letter was sent to the creditor and the date on which the 
application for sequestration was brought. It decided that the appropriate time for 
determining if a reasonable person in the position of the creditor would have 
construed the letter as a notice of inability to pay was when the letter was received. 
This was because "the question is what it means to the recipient at the time of its 
receipt".46  
 
Wallis J viewed the most pertinent fact known to the bank at the time when it 
received the letter to be that Evans "was significantly in default of his obligation 
under both the bonds and the loan agreement". He reasoned that the bank, clearly 
familiar with the provisions of the NCA, would have construed the letter as 
unequivocally conveying to it that he was unable to repay the amounts borrowed in 
accordance with his contractual undertakings.47 The court regarded such a 
                                            
44   FirstRand Bank Ltd v Evans para 11. 
45   FirstRand Bank Ltd v Evans par a13. (It should be noted that, from para 13 of the judgment 
onwards, there is a discrepancy between the paragraph numbering reflected in the judgment that 
was published immediately after it was delivered by Wallis J and the judgment that was edited 
and published in Juta's South African Law Reports.)   
46   FirstRand Bank Ltd v Evans para 15, with reference to Optima Fertilizers (Pty) Ltd v Turner 1968 
4 SA 29 (D), Meskin Insolvency Law para 2.1.2.7, and Chenille Industries v Vorster 1953 2 SA 
691 (O) 696 D-E.  
47   FirstRand Bank Ltd v Evans para 16. 
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construction as having been reinforced by the fact that Evans was in arrears with his 
payments and was cancelling a debit order by means of which he was supposed to 
be meeting his obligations arising from the loan agreement. The court concluded that 
Evans was "unequivocally conveying to … [the bank] that he was at that time unable 
to pay his debts".48 Wallis J took into account the fact that the position is the same in 
relation to applications for administration orders in terms of section 74 of the 
Magistrates' Courts Act 32 of 1944.49 He stated that an application for debt review 
under the NCA, as opposed to any other type of request for debt re-arrangement, did 
not change the fact that the letter was a notice of inability to pay debts.50  
 
The main contention put forward on behalf of Evans was that the NCA precluded an 
application by FirstRand Bank for the sequestration of Evans' estate.51 Counsel for 
Evans submitted that the effect of a debt re-arrangement order is to alter the debtor's 
contractual obligation to the creditor so that Evans was obliged to pay only a reduced 
sum every month in discharge of his indebtedness in terms of the mortgage bonds 
and not the amount upon which they had originally agreed.52 However, the court did 
not regard a debt re-arrangement order as altering the contractual obligation 
between the parties but as merely precluding the creditor from pursuing its 
contractual rights for so long as the debtor is complying with the debt re-arrangement 
order. Wallis J pointed out that if the debtor does not comply with the debt re-
arrangement order the creditor is not restricted to claiming remedies on the basis of 
"an amended contract". Instead, the bar, or "moratorium",53 on exercising or 
enforcing by litigation or other judicial process any right or security under the credit 
agreement is removed and the creditor is entitled to pursue in full its contractual 
remedies according to the terms of their original agreement.  
 
However, the court stated that once it is recognised that an application for 
sequestration does not constitute the enforcement of a credit agreement it must 
follow that any moratorium to claiming payment under the credit agreement is not a 
                                            
48   FirstRand Bank Ltd v Evans para 18. 
49   Hereafter referred to as the "Magistrates' Courts Act". See FirstRand Bank Ltd v Evans para 22, 
with reference to Madari v Cassim 1950 2 SA 35 (D). 
50   FirstRand Bank Ltd v Evans para 22. 
51   FirstRand Bank Ltd v Evans paras 23-25. 
52   FirstRand Bank Ltd v Evans paras 34, 35. 
53   FirstRand Bank Ltd v Evans para 35. 
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bar to the granting of a sequestration order. According to this reasoning, the fact that 
a debt re-arrangement order has been issued by the magistrate's court does not 
necessarily affect the situation.54 Wallis J considered it important that to hold "that 
the NCA operates to preclude credit providers from sequestrating the estates of their 
debtors, but does not prevent other creditors from doing so", would give rise to the 
anomalous position that credit providers would be placed in "a class of creditor 
excluded from invoking the mechanisms of the Insolvency Act".55   
 
In the circumstances, the court decided that all of the requirements in terms of the 
Insolvency Act for the granting of a provisional sequestration order had been met. In 
this regard, it stated that the bank had a liquidated claim against Evans for more than 
R100, Evans had committed an act of insolvency in terms of section 8(g), and 
sequestration would be to the advantage of creditors as the realisation of Evans' 
assets would result in a not negligible dividend for creditors. The court stated that 
there were also matters that could properly be investigated by a trustee including, in 
view of the discrepancies in the figures furnished by Evans, the source and amount 
of his income, the identity of his employer (whom the court suspected might be his 
17 year-old son), and the nature of his current business activities. Therefore, all that 
remained was for the court to consider if it ought to exercise its discretion against 
granting a provisional sequestration order.56   
 
Wallis J stated that he was unable to find much authority on how this discretion 
should be exercised. He noted that this might be an indication of how unusual it is for 
courts to exercise their discretion in favour of a debtor once all of the requirements 
had been established on a prima facie basis. He regarded the position as being that 
in the absence of special or unusual circumstances – which the respondent must 
establish – the court should ordinarily grant the provisional sequestration order. In 
this regard Evans relied on the lapse of almost a year between the date on which the 
letter was sent and the date on which the application for sequestration had been 
brought. He also relied on his compliance with the debt re-arrangement order 
between August 2009 and April 2010, in the course of which he reduced his 
                                            
54   FirstRand Bank Ltd v Evans para 35. 
55   FirstRand Bank Ltd v Evans para 25. Boraine and Van Heerden 2010 PELJ 118 also identified 
this anomaly. 
56   FirstRand Bank Ltd v Evans para 26. 
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indebtedness to the bank by R200 000, as well as the improvement in his overall 
financial position by reason of the sale of one of the mortgaged properties.  
 
The court dismissed the argument that the lapse of time was material to the proper 
use of its discretion as it did not regard this as a case where there had clearly been 
an improvement in the debtor's financial position that would render the act of 
insolvency "stale".57 On the contrary, the court expressed the view that it was clear 
why and "hardly surprising" that the bank brought the application for sequestration 
when it did. As the court saw it, the bank had been confronted by the prospect of 
protracted litigation in respect of the default judgment that it had obtained against 
Evans. Further, in the face of the latter's mounting indebtedness to it, with the 
payments which he was making in terms of the debt re-arrangement order not even 
covering the interest which it was charging in terms of the original agreement, it had 
chosen to have recourse to sequestration proceedings. The court was also 
dismissive of Evans' anticipation of discharging his indebtedness to the bank as 
"overly optimistic"58 and based on "a highly speculative assumption" about the 
improvement of his financial position.59 The court was also sceptical about whether 
Evans had engaged in full and frank disclosure to it about his financial 
circumstances.60 Finally, on this point, Wallis J quoted the dictum of Innes CJ in De 
Waard v Andrew & Thienhaus Limited61 that included the statement: "Now, when a 
man commits an act of insolvency he must expect his estate to be sequestrated. The 
matter is not sprung on him … "62  
 
Wallis J did accept that in a clear case, where the debts have been re-arranged by 
way of an order in terms of section 87 of the NCA and where it is apparent that this 
will result in the debts being discharged within a reasonable time, this would 
constitute a powerful reason for the court to exercise its discretion against the 
granting of a sequestration order.63 However, in the circumstances the court did not 
                                            
57   FirstRand Bank Ltd v Evans paras 30, 32. 
58   FirstRand Bank Ltd v Evans para 31. 
59   FirstRand Bank Ltd v Evans para 30. 
60   FirstRand Bank Ltd v Evans para 31. 
61   De Waard v Andrew & Thienhaus Limited 1907 TS 727 (hereafter "De Waard v Andrew & 
Thienhaus Limited"). 
62   FirstRand Bank Ltd v Evans para 33, with reference to De Waard v Andrew & Thienhaus Limited 
733. 
63   FirstRand Bank Ltd v Evans para 36. 
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regard the matter before it as being such "a clear case" because it doubted the 
existence and validity of the debt re-arrangement order.64 Another factor that 
weighed against the exercise of the court's discretion in favour of Evans was that it 
viewed the debt re-arrangement order as purporting to extend his indebtedness to 
the bank far beyond the terms of the original agreements.65  Wallis J also considered 
the submission on behalf of Evans that he was in possession of sufficient income to 
pay his outstanding indebtedness to the bank in the ordinary course by way of 
monthly instalments on a loan on conventional terms. Wallis remarked that if this 
was indeed the position then there should be no reason why Evans could not either 
apply for reinstatement of his loan from the bank or obtain a loan from another 
financial institution. Wallis J suspected that he had not done this because his 
financial position was not as good as had been portrayed by counsel on his behalf. 
In the result, the court declined to exercise its discretion in favour of Evans, the 
respondent, and it granted an order for the provisional sequestration of his estate.66 
 
4.3 Comments 
 
The judgment in FirstRand Bank v Evans may be regarded as having extended the 
rationale behind the decisions in Investec v Mutemeri and Naidoo v ABSA, that 
sequestration proceedings do not constitute enforcement of a debt, to apply to a 
novel situation or sphere hitherto not addressed by the courts. This is the situation 
where an application for debt review in terms of the NCA constitutes an act of 
insolvency for the purposes of the Insolvency Act. Further, the position was different 
in Investec v Mutemeri and Naidoo v ABSA in that those cases concerned situations 
where the debtor had applied for debt review but not where a debt re-arrangement 
order had already been issued by the magistrate's court.  
 
In FirstRand Bank v Evans the bank claimed that it had terminated the debt review in 
terms of section 86(10) of the NCA. On the other hand, Evans claimed that a debt re-
arrangement order had been issued by the magistrate's court and that he had 
complied with its terms by making regular payments to the bank in accordance with 
                                            
64   FirstRand Bank Ltd v Evans paras 35, 36. This aspect of the decision is discussed at 4.3 below. 
65   FirstRand Bank Ltd v Evans paras 38, 39. 
66   FirstRand Bank Ltd v Evans para 42. 
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it. Wallis J doubted the existence and validity of the debt re-arrangement order but 
adopted the approach that in any event the existence of a debt re-arrangement order 
did not affect the situation because the NCA did not preclude an application for 
sequestration of the debtor's estate.67 Unfortunately, it is submitted, the judgment 
does not make it clear what the reason might have been for its existence and validity 
being open to doubt68 nor what the issue surrounding "the provisional debt re-
arrangement order", as the court referred to it,69 entailed. How it came about that a 
rule nisi was issued by the magistrate's court is not explained. Nor is the reference 
by the court to "the impact of the order for a stay of operation of the debt re-
arrangement order".70 It is submitted that clarity on the facts surrounding this issue 
would have been useful in order better to understand the court's justification for not 
exercising its discretion in favour of the debtor, in the circumstances, to dismiss the 
application for the sequestration order. 
 
Wallis J referred to "protestations" by Evans' counsel that the effect of the court's 
approach would be that any debtor who informs his creditors that he has applied for 
debt review or that he is in the process of debt review commits an act of 
insolvency.71 In response to this, with reference to the judgment of Caney AJ, as he 
then was, in Madari v Cassim,72  Wallis J pointed out that a debtor who applied for 
an administration order in terms of section 74 of the Magistrates' Courts Act was in 
precisely that situation. However, it may be noted that in Madari v Cassim the 
situation was not exactly the same. In that case, the debtor had applied for an 
administration order but it had not yet been granted. Therefore, when the creditor 
applied for the sequestration of the debtor's estate the latter's obligations had not yet 
been restructured by a court order. Further, in Madari v Cassim it was common 
cause that the respondent had committed an act of insolvency in terms of section 
8(g) of the Insolvency Act by applying for an administration order in terms of section 
                                            
67   FirstRand Bank Ltd v Evans para 35.  
68   FirstRand Bank Ltd v Evans para 37. 
69   FirstRand Bank Ltd v Evans para 34. Reference was also made to it at paras 27 (containing a 
reference to "the interim debt arrangement order"), 30 (containing a reference to payments 
having been made "purportedly in terms of a debt re-arrangement order"), 33 (containing a 
reference to the "alleged debt re-arrangement"), and 37 (a reference to "the status of the debt re-
arrangement order … [being] highly questionable").  
70   FirstRand Bank Ltd v Evans para 37. 
71   FirstRand Bank Ltd v Evans para 21. 
72   Madari v Cassim 1950 2 SA 35 (D), hereafter referred to as "Madari v Cassim".  
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74 of the Magistrates' Courts Act.73 In Madari v Cassim the court discharged the 
provisional order of sequestration on the basis that advantage to creditors had not 
been shown, but also stated:74 
 
Even if I felt that there were reason prima facie to believe that sequestration would 
be to the advantage of creditors, I would not be disposed in this case to confirm the 
provisional order, but to exercise a discretion against doing so. I consider that 
where a debtor has applied for an administration order in the circumstances in 
which the respondent has, this is a special consideration disentitling the petitioner to 
his order, within the contemplation of what Broome J said at p 165 in Port 
Shepstone Fresh Meat and Fish Co (Pty) Ltd v Schultz (1940 NPD 163). In my 
opinion debtors such as the respondent, and in his circumstances, should not be 
deterred from using the machinery provided by sec 74 of the Magistrates' Courts 
Act, and creditors should, in general, show good reason for superseding 
applications under that section or otherwise allow their debtor at any rate an 
opportunity of being heard on his application if he has filed one with the clerk of the 
court. 
 
The decision in Port Shepstone Fresh Meat and Fish Co (Pty) Ltd v Schultz, referred 
to in the passage quoted above, followed precedent established in De Waard v 
Andrew & Thienhaus Limited, which was also referred to by Wallis J.75 However, it 
should be noted that the decision in Madari v Cassim, as indicated in the passage 
quoted above, qualified the statements made in both of those cases in relation to the 
entitlement of an applicant creditor to a sequestration order, in the circumstances. It 
is submitted that it ought also to be borne in mind that in Madari v Cassim, despite 
the lack of complete candour on the part of the debtor in that in his application for an 
administration order he had failed to disclose two of his debts, the court indicated 
that it nevertheless would not have granted a sequestration order.76 This is in 
contradistinction to the approach of Wallis J in FirstRand Bank v Evans. 
 
It is submitted that Evans' substantial reduction of his indebtedness to the bank, by 
applying the proceeds of the sale of the mortgaged sectional title property to it, could 
have been regarded as "a special consideration disentitling the petitioning creditor to 
his order", as contemplated by Broome J in Port Shepstone Fresh Meat and Fish Co 
                                            
73   See, also, significant differences between the circumstances in Madari v Cassim and FirstRand 
Bank Ltd v Evans that Goosen J identified in FirstRandBank v Janse van Rensburg, discussed at 
5.2 below. 
74   Madari v Cassim 39.  
75   See Port Shepstone Fresh Meat and Fish Co (Pty) Ltd v Schultz 1940 NPD 163 165. See also 
FirstRand Bank Ltd v Evans para 33.  
76   See Madari v Cassim 36. 
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(Pty) Ltd v Schultz. This is referred to in the passage quoted from the judgment in 
Madari v Cassim. It is therefore submitted that in the circumstances it would have 
been appropriate to refuse to grant the sequestration order and, in the light of his 
improved financial circumstances and the reduction of his indebtedness to the bank, 
to give Evans an opportunity  to fulfil his obligations. This would also have been in 
keeping with the policy of consumer protection that is reflected in the NCA. 
 
5 FirstRand Bank v Janse van Rensburg  
 
5.1 The facts and the issues  
 
In FirstRand Bank v Janse van Rensburg FirstRand Bank brought separate 
applications for the sequestration of the estate of each of two spouses, Heinrich and 
Azelle Janse van Rensburg, who were married to each other out of community of 
property. The applications were apparently unopposed by the respondents. The facts 
were that FirstRand Bank had lent and advanced money to a close corporation of 
which the respondents were members, each of whom held a 50% membership 
interest. In respect of such a loan obligation the respondents had undertaken 
suretyship obligations secured by way of a mortgage bond passed over their 
immovable property77 in favour of the bank. 
 
In each application for sequestration FirstRand Bank relied on the commission of an 
act of insolvency in terms of section 8(g) of the Insolvency Act. It alleged that each 
respondent had committed such an act of insolvency by applying in terms of section 
86(7)(c) of the NCA to be declared over-indebted. To confirm this fact the bank relied 
on a consumer profile report issued by a credit bureau stating that each of the 
respondents had applied for debt review.78 The court, per Goosen J, noted that the 
credit bureau reports simply reflected that each respondent had "applied for a debt 
rehabilitation or to be placed under debt review with a registered debt counsellor" 
and that no further details were supplied except that application had been made on 
23 March 2011. The court requested counsel specifically to address the question of if 
                                            
77   There was some doubt as to whether or not it was owned by both of them; see FirstRand Bank v 
Janse van Rensburg para 4. 
78   FirstRand Bank v Janse van Rensburg para 5. 
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an application for debt review constitutes an act of insolvency and if in the 
circumstances the applicant had established that an act of insolvency in terms of 
section 8(g) of the Insolvency Act had been committed.79 
 
5.2 The decision 
 
Counsel for FirstRand Bank submitted that the judgment of Wallis J in FirstRand 
Bank v Evans "is clear authority for the proposition that the fact of an application for 
debt review constitutes an act of insolvency which falls within the ambit of section 
8(g) of the Insolvency Act" and that proof of that fact is therefore sufficient to enable 
an applicant to rely on the provisions of section 8(g).80 However, Goosen J found this 
argument to be without merit. He stated that in his view the judgment in FirstRand 
Bank v Evans is not authority for the general proposition that the mere fact of an 
application for debt review in terms of the NCA constitutes compliance with the 
provisions of section 8(g) of the Insolvency Act. Goosen J pointed out that the finding 
that Evans had committed an act of insolvency turned on his delivery to the bank of a 
written notice drawing to its attention that he had been placed under debt review 
and, in the light of the particular facts of the case, on the reasonable interpretation of 
such a written notice by the bank.81 Goosen J emphasised that Wallis J had not been 
called upon to decide nor did he hold that notice of the mere fact of an application for 
debt review ipso facto constitutes written notice of inability to pay a debt as required 
by section 8(g).82  
 
Further, Goosen J viewed Wallis J's remarks that the position in relation to debt 
review is not novel but is the same as the position in relation to administration orders 
                                            
79   FirstRand Bank v Janse van Rensburg paras 6-7. 
80   FirstRand Bank v Janse van Rensburg para 15. 
81   FirstRand Bank v Janse van Rensburg paras 16-17. Goosen J further pointed out that Wallis J's 
approach, relying on a dictum in Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd v Court 1993 3 SA 286 (C) 
292 H-J, which was later approved by the Appellate Division in Court v Standard Bank of South 
Africa Ltd 1995 3 SA 123 (A) 134 A-C, was consistent with a long line of authorities which require 
a court, in the construction of a written notice alleged to be a notice in terms of s 8(g), to consider 
the terms of such a notice and, where appropriate, the circumstances in which it was given to a 
creditor. Goosen J referred in this regard to Barlows (Eastern Province) Ltd v Bouwer 1950 4 SA 
385 (E) 390; Shaban & Co (Pty) Ltd v Plank 1966 1 SA 59 (O); Rodrew (Pty) Ltd v Rossouw 
1975 3 SA 137 (O); Du Plessis v Tzerefos 1979 4 SA 819 (O); and Optima Fertilizers (Pty) Ltd v 
Turner 1968 4 SA 29 (D). 
82   FirstRand Bank v Janse van Rensburg paras 16, 18 and 19. 
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in terms of section 74 of the Magistrates' Courts Act as having been made obiter.83 
Goosen J pointed out that the judgment in Madari v Cassim is not authority for the 
proposition that an application for debt review in terms of the NCA constitutes in itself 
an act of insolvency.84 He stated that in Madari v Cassim the decision did not turn on 
whether an act of insolvency had been committed – its commission appeared to 
have been common cause – but pointed out that the issue was whether it had been 
established that sequestration would be to the advantage of creditors.85  
 
Goosen J also explained that the procedure to be followed in an application for an 
administration order in terms of section 74 of the Magistrates' Courts Act is materially 
different from that required by the NCA for debt review. He pointed out that the 
former procedure "constitutes a 'modified form of insolvency' applicable to small 
estates in which a concursus creditorum is created allowing for a court-sanctioned 
debt rearrangement".86 Further, an application for an administration order requires 
the submission of a detailed statement of affairs that sets out the financial affairs of 
the applicant (the correctness of which must be confirmed under oath by the 
applicant), a motivation for the basis upon which the applicant is unable to meet his 
financial obligations and, significantly, the delivery of a notice of the application to 
creditors.87 Thus, as Goosen J explained, the application itself meets the 
requirements of section 8(g) of the Insolvency Act in that the debtor gives notice in 
writing to the creditor that he is unable to pay his debts. Therefore, he stated, the 
authorities dealing with applications for administration orders ought to be read in this 
context.88 Goosen J added that, according to the established precedent relevant to 
applications for administration orders in terms of section 74 of the Magistrates' 
Courts Act, in construing the notice to the creditor for the purposes of determining 
whether it constitutes an act of insolvency  in terms of section 8(g) of the Insolvency 
Act or not, the whole content of the application (for an administration order) should 
be considered. This was required in order to ensure that "the notice conveys an 
                                            
83   FirstRand Bank v Janse van Rensburg para 19. 
84   FirstRand Bank v Janse van Rensburg para 20. 
85   FirstRand Bank v Janse van Rensburg para 21. 
86   FirstRand Bank v Janse van Rensburg paar 22, with reference to Jones and Buckle Civil Practice 
of the Magistrate's Courts, Madari v Cassim 38 and Weiner v Broekhuysen 2003 4 SA 301 (SCA) 
para 3.  
87   FirstRand Bank v Janse van Rensburg para 23. 
88   FirstRand Bank v Janse van Rensburg paras 24 and 25. 
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unequivocal statement of inability to pay … and that the creditor receiving the notice 
can reasonably conclude that the debtor is unable rather than merely unwilling to pay 
his debts".89  
 
On the other hand, as Goosen J pointed out, the procedure required for an 
application for debt review in terms of the NCA is very different from that which an 
application for an administration order in terms of section 74 of the Magistrates' 
Courts Act entails. In terms of section 86 of the NCA read with regulation 24 of the 
Regulations promulgated in terms of it, a consumer debtor applies for debt review by 
submitting a completed NCR Form 16, together with certain specified documents 
and information, to a registered debt counsellor. Thereafter, within a stipulated 
period the debt counsellor is required to issue all credit providers identified in the 
application with a notice in the prescribed NCR Form 17.1 informing them that an 
application for debt review has been received. After making a determination, again 
within a stipulated period, the debt counsellor is obliged to issue a further notice in 
the prescribed NCR Form 17.2 informing them of the outcome. This would be 
whether the debtor has been found not to be over-indebted as envisaged by section 
79 of the NCA or has been declared to be over-indebted and has been referred to a 
magistrate for debt restructuring.90  
 
In the result, as Goosen J stated, an application for debt review in terms of section 
86 of the NCA does not entail the debtor's giving written notice to the creditor of an 
inability to pay one or more of his debts. He reasoned further that a notice of inability 
to pay as envisaged by section 8(g) of the Insolvency Act must be given deliberately 
and with the intention of giving such notice91 and must be such that a creditor can 
reasonably conclude that that the debtor is unable to pay his debts. However, it 
ought to be borne in mind that in order to constitute an act of insolvency in terms of 
section 8(g) of the Insolvency Act, regardless of the fact that the creditor might have 
                                            
89   FirstRand Bank v Janse van Rensburg para 26, with reference to Barlows (Eastern Province) Ltd 
v Bouwer 1950 4 SA 385 (E); Shaban & Co (Pty) Ltd v Plank 1966 1 SA 59 (O); and Rodrew 
(Pty) Ltd v Rossouw 1975 3 SA 137 (O). 
90   FirstRand Bank v Janse van Rensburg para 27. 
91   FirstRand Bank v Janse van Rensburg para 28, with reference to Bertelsmann, Mars and Nagel 
Law of Insolvency 97. 
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construed the notice in this manner, the words of the notification must convey an 
unequivocal statement by the debtor of his inability to meet his obligations.92  
 
Turning to the facts of the case in FirstRand Bank v Janse van Rensburg, the court 
noted that the bank had not relied on any written communication to it by each debtor 
but merely on a profile report issued by a credit bureau reflecting that they had 
applied for debt review in terms of the NCA. Goosen J also pointed out that the 
profile report did not contain details of the terms of the application for debt review nor 
any reference to statements and declarations made by the debtors, nor any 
information on which the creditor could determine that it was an unequivocal 
statement of an inability to pay. Thus, in the court's view it did not constitute an act of 
insolvency in terms of section 8(g) of the Insolvency Act.93 
 
The court dealt further with the bank's reliance on inferential reasoning in the sense 
that it contended that a debtor seeks debt review when he is over-indebted and that 
the very fact that a debtor seeks a declaration of over-indebtedness is indicative of a 
declaration of an inability to pay one or more of his debts. Goosen J regarded such 
inferential reasoning not only as unsound but also as contrary to the express 
requirements of section 8(g) of the Insolvency Act, that a debtor must give written 
notice to a creditor of his inability to pay his debts.94 The court also alluded to the 
further difficulty in the matter before it that the written notice relied upon by FirstRand 
Bank had not been communicated by the debtor but by a credit bureau that did not 
have the debtors' necessary authority to make declarations on their behalf nor to 
bind them to declarations made in relation to their affairs. Goosen J referred in this 
regard to the judgment in Eli Spilkin (Pty) Ltd v Mather95 in which Kannemeyer J 
stated:96 
 
If an agent, on behalf of a debtor, writes a letter which amounts to an act of 
insolvency in terms of section 8(g) of the Insolvency Act the court must be satisfied 
                                            
92   FirstRand Bank v Janse van Rensburg para 28, with reference to Bertelsmann, Mars and Nagel 
Law of Insolvency 99; Barlows (Eastern Province) Ltd v Bouwer 1950 4 SA 385 (E); and Optima 
Fertilizers (Pty) Ltd v Turner 1968 4 SA 29 (D).  
93   FirstRand Bank v Janse van Rensburg paras 29-30. 
94   FirstRand Bank v Janse van Rensburg para 31. 
95   Eli Spilkin (Pty) Ltd v Mather 1970 4 SA 22 (E), hereafter referred to as "Eli Spilkin v Mather". 
96   Eli Spilkin v Mather 24A-B, referred to in FirstRand Bank v Janse van Rensburg para 32. 
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that the principal knew that the letter was being written in those terms and 
consented to it being so written. 
 
Distinguishing the situation where an act of insolvency may be committed "through 
an agent" who manages the principal's affairs,97 Goosen J concluded that the credit 
bureau had not acted on the basis of any authority specifically conferred on it by the 
respondents nor on any general authority which bound them. The court further did 
not find that the content of the credit bureau's report was evidence of the existence 
of a Form 16 declaration made by the respondents nor that such a declaration in the 
ordinary course necessarily amounts to a declaration of an inability to pay. Goosen J 
viewed such reasoning as extending the reach of section 8(g) of the Insolvency Act 
far beyond its purpose.98  
 
The judgment noted that counsel had pointed out that a Form 17.1 notice had not 
been delivered to the applicant as required by the NCA and that it did not have 
access to the Form 16 application made to the debt counsellor. Therefore counsel 
had argued that the credit bureau's report should be accepted as the best evidence 
available to it of the commission of the act of insolvency. In relation to this argument, 
Goosen J stated:99 
 
That may indeed be so but it is not sufficient. An applicant who seeks to invoke the 
provisions of the Insolvency Act must prove either that an act of insolvency as 
specifically provided by the Act has been committed or that the respondent is 
actually insolvent. If the applicant is not able to do so it cannot succeed with the 
sequestration order.                      
 
In the result, the applications for the sequestration of the estates of both respondents 
were dismissed.100 
 
5.3 Comments 
 
The effect of the judgment in FirstRand Bank v Janse van Rensburg is to introduce 
important qualifications in principle to the decision of Wallis J in FirstRand Bank v 
                                            
97   As, so Goosen J stated at para 33, had been the case in Eli Spilkin v Mather. 
98   FirstRand Bank v Janse van Rensburg para 34. 
99   FirstRand Bank v Janse van Rensburg para 35. 
100  FirstRand Bank v Janse van Rensburg para 37-38. 
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Evans. It is submitted that, following the rationale and decision in FirstRand Bank v 
Janse van Rensburg, the following two significant points may be made. First, the fact 
that a debtor has applied for debt review in terms of the NCA does not per se 
constitute the commission of an act of insolvency as envisaged by section 8(g) of the 
Insolvency Act. It is submitted that this makes logical sense and accords with the 
approach of the Supreme Court of Appeal in Collett v FirstRand Bank Ltd,101 
delivered after FirstRand Bank v Evans. In Collett v FirstRand Bank, the appeal court 
stated that an application by a debtor for debt review, to be declared over-indebted, 
and to have debts arising from credit agreements rescheduled are "novel concepts" 
introduced by the NCA with the purpose "to assist not only consumers who are over-
indebted but also those who find themselves in 'strained' circumstances".102 It is 
therefore submitted that one cannot assume that a debtor who applies for debt 
review with a view to having his debts re-arranged is unequivocally declaring that he 
is unable to pay his debts and not merely conveying an unwillingness to do so in his 
financially "strained" circumstances. In FirstRand Bank v Janse van Rensburg, 
Goosen J regarded the inferential reasoning that counsel for FirstRand Bank sought 
to be applied to the situation, in order to find that an act of insolvency in terms of 
section 8(g) of the Insolvency Act had been committed, as excessive. It is submitted 
that this stance is to be preferred to the approach adopted by Wallis J in FirstRand 
Bank v Evans that "a debtor who informs his creditor that he has applied for or is 
under debt review is necessarily informing the creditor that he is over-indebted and 
unable to pay his debts".103   
 
The second point that emerges clearly from the judgment in FirstRand Bank v Janse 
van Rensburg is that there are substantial differences between an application for an 
administration order in terms of section 74 of the Magistrates' Courts Act on the one 
hand, and an application for debt review in terms of section 86 of the NCA on the 
other. These differences exist not only in the procedure required for each type of 
                                            
101  Collett v FirstRand Bank Ltd 2011 4 SA 508 (SCA), hereafter referred to as "Collett v FirstRand 
Bank". 
102  Collett v FirstRand Bank para 9. It may be noted that this passage was emphasised by counsel 
for Evans during argument on the return day, on 26 August 2011. (Respondent's heads of 
argument are on file with the author.) According to information obtained by the author from legal 
representatives of Evans, a differently constituted court confirmed the provisional sequestration 
order and the matter has gone on appeal.    
103  FirstRand Bank Ltd v Evans para 13. 
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application but also in the policies reflected in the NCA and the Insolvency Act 
respectively. Therefore, precedent relevant to applications for administration orders 
in terms of section 74 of the Magistrates' Courts Act should not be applied 
automatically, in cases concerning the NCA and its interface with the Insolvency Act, 
to hold that an application for debt review amounts to an act of insolvency in terms of 
section 8(g) of the Insolvency Act. It is submitted that this was correctly pointed out 
by Goosen J.104 
 
The facts of FirstRand Bank v Janse van Rensburg are clearly distinguishable from 
those in FirstRand Bank v Evans. In FirstRand Bank v Janse van Rensburg the 
applicant did not establish that written notice had been given by the debtors to any of 
their creditors that they were unable to pay any of their debts. This was because the 
court did not regard a report issued by a credit bureau, reflecting that they had 
"applied for a debt rehabilitation or to be placed under debt review with a registered 
debt counsellor" as being sufficient evidence of the commission of an act of 
insolvency as envisaged by section 8(g) of the Insolvency Act. It may also be noted 
that in FirstRand Bank v Janse van Rensburg no other evidence was advanced to 
establish that the respondents had been declared over-indebted or that their debts 
had been re-arranged by the court in consequence of the debt review process. 
 
Reading between the lines, one might gain the impression from the judgment in 
FirstRand Bank v Janse van Rensburg that if the Form 17.1 notification had been 
delivered to the applicant as required by the NCA, the position might have been 
different. However, it should be borne in mind that according to the judgment delivery 
of the Form 17.1 notification may constitute an act of insolvency in terms of section 
8(g) only if it contains sufficient detail to amount to the debtor's giving notice in 
writing – albeit through the agency of a debt counsellor – to any one of his creditors 
that he is unable to pay any of his debts. Further, the content of the written notice 
must be such that the reasonable creditor, given its knowledge at the time of the 
receipt of the notice, would construe the notice as an unequivocal declaration that 
the debtor is unable, and not merely unwilling, to pay his debts. However, given the 
                                            
104  See FirstRand Bank v Janse van Rensburg paras 25 and 26. 
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prescribed text of NCR Form 17.1,105 it is submitted that it would be unlikely in 
practice for it to contain the sort of detailed information that would necessarily render 
it an unequivocal declaration of an inability to pay as required by section 8(g) of the 
Insolvency Act, in the light of the courts' interpretation of this subsection. Further, as 
Goosen J pointed out, for any notification by a debt counsellor to the creditors to 
constitute an act of insolvency in terms of section 8(g) of the Insolvency Act, it would 
have to be authorised by the debtor in order to be regarded as binding on the latter.  
 
Neither FirstRand Bank v Evans nor FirstRand Bank v Janse van Rensburg dealt 
with an act of insolvency as envisaged by section 8(e) of the Insolvency Act. It may 
be recalled that this was one of the acts of insolvency initially alleged to have been 
committed in Nedbank v Andrews. It is submitted that the decisions in FirstRand 
Bank v Evans and FirstRand Bank v Janse van Rensburg provide no indication of 
any reason, in theory, why the debt review and re-arrangement process would not 
constitute an act of insolvency in terms of section 8(e) of the Insolvency Act. 
However, it may be noted that in terms of section 8(e) a debtor commits an act of 
insolvency if he "makes or offers to make any arrangement with any of his creditors 
for releasing him wholly or partially from his debts". Given that the NCA envisages 
that the debtor will satisfy his debts in full, the offer of the arrangement by the debtor 
may not necessarily include any proposition for or contemplation of any release from 
any debts.     
 
6 Implications of the recent decisions in relation to consumer debt relief 
measures 
 
Otto and Otto stated that "[t]he exact influence of insolvency law on the National 
Credit Act, and vice versa, is something that still has to be worked out by the 
courts".106 Indeed, the recent judgments seem to suggest that this is precisely what 
the courts are engaged in doing. Otto and Otto noted that Van Heerden had 
suggested that an application for debt review in terms of the relevant provisions of 
                                            
105  See Form 17.1 in the Regulations to the NCA published in GNR 489 in GG 28864 of 31 May 
2006.  
106  Otto and Otto National Credit Act Explained 134. 
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the NCA might constitute an act of insolvency in terms of the Insolvency Act.107 Otto 
and Otto pointed out that it could be argued, on the other hand, that the "well-
intentioned legislative initiative" reflected in the NCA's unique procedure, including 
debt review and re-arrangement, would be frustrated if sequestration might "ipso iure 
follow upon an application for debt review". In other words, it could be argued that 
the NCA "as lex specifica should enjoy preference over the Insolvency Act … and 
insolvency law in this particular instance".108 However, they left the question open, 
stating that it remained to be seen what the courts would decide in this respect. In 
FirstRand Bank v Evans, clearly the court held that a letter by a debtor to the creditor 
conveying the fact of his application for debt review in particular circumstances 
constitutes an act of insolvency in terms of section 8(g) of the Insolvency Act. 
However, it remains to be seen if this decision will be followed.109 Further, as stated 
above, neither FirstRand Bank v Evans nor FirstRand Bank v Janse van Rensburg 
necessarily excludes an application for debt review and debt re-arrangement's 
constituting an act of insolvency in terms of section 8(e) of the Insolvency Act.  
 
It is submitted that a clear decision is required in relation to whether or not a creditor 
may obtain an order for the sequestration of the estate of a debtor who is making 
regular payments in compliance with a debt re-arrangement order in terms of the 
NCA. While this may indeed be the position in the light of the fact that the NCA does 
not specifically preclude it, clarity is nevertheless required on how a court ought to 
exercise its discretion whether to grant or dismiss an application for a sequestration 
order in such circumstances. Clearly, in the context of the decision in FirstRand Bank 
v Janse van Rensburg, precedents regarding the commission of acts of insolvency in 
applications for administration orders in terms of section 74 of the Magistrates' 
Courts Act are not directly applicable. As far as the exercise of the court's discretion 
is concerned, Van Heerden and Boraine suggested that a court could, in an 
application for sequestration, determine that "a debt restructuring order should be 
maintained as it appears to be more advantageous [to creditors] than 
sequestration".110  
                                            
107  Otto and Otto National Credit Act Explained 134, with reference to Van Heerden "The interaction 
between debt review" 153. 
108  Otto and Otto National Credit Act Explained 134.  
109  See comments at n 102 above.  
110  Van Heerden and Boraine 2009 PELJ 55. 
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As noted above, in Collett v FirstRand Bank the Supreme Court of Appeal stated that 
debt review, a declaration of over-indebtedness, and the rescheduling of debts 
arising out of credit agreements are "novel concepts" introduced by the NCA with the 
purpose "to assist not only consumers who are over-indebted, but also those who 
find themselves in 'strained' circumstances".111 It is submitted that the effect of the 
decision in FirstRand Bank v Evans was to counteract such assistance, which in the 
circumstances the debtor had sought and had already received. If a debtor is making 
regular payments in accordance with a debt re-arrangement order issued in terms of 
section 87 of the NCA and his estate is nevertheless sequestrated by a creditor 
whose claim arises out of an obligation that is subject to the debt re-arrangement 
order, the debtor is left in an anomalous and vulnerable position. It is submitted that 
this could not have been what the legislature intended, and that the possibility of this 
eventuating reflects the presence of a lacuna in the provisions of the NCA.112  
 
In the circumstances, it is submitted that statutory amendments should be brought 
about to provide for an explicit, workable relationship between the debt review 
process and sequestration.113 Consideration should be given to the suggestions 
made by Maghembe for the amendment of relevant provisions of the NCA to 
preclude a creditor from bringing an application for the sequestration of the debtor's 
estate in specific circumstances.114 However, it is submitted that even more 
extensive legislative intervention is called for. It is submitted that FirstRand Bank v 
Evans is indicative of the need, on a practical level, for solutions to be found in order 
to combat or at least reduce credit grantors' opposition or resistance to debt review 
and debt restructuring as consumer debt relief measures that pose alternatives to 
sequestration.115 From the judgment in FirstRand Bank v Evans it appears that the 
bank's main concern was the fact that the monthly payment due to it in terms of the 
debt restructuring order did not even cover the interest which would have been due 
                                            
111  Collett v FirstRand Bank para 9, referred to at n 101 and n 102 above.    
112  See also remarks in this regard by Otto and Otto National Credit Act Explained 134, referred to at 
n 108 above.  
113  See also Maghembe 2011 PELJ 178-179; Kupiso 2011 De Rebus 27. 
114  After Naidoo v ABSA, Maghembe 2011 PELJ 178-179 suggested specific amendments to ss 
88(3) and 129 of the NCA. 
115  See in this regard Roestoff et al 2009 PELJ 298.  
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according to their original agreement.116 Where this is indeed the case, one may 
appreciate why a creditor, and especially a secured creditor such as a mortgagee, 
might prefer to proceed with the sequestration of the debtor's estate in order to have 
the assets, including hypothecated property, liquidated and the debt satisfied out of 
the proceeds of their sale. However, this leaves the debtor in a vulnerable position 
despite his having availed himself of the formal consumer debt relief measures that 
are available to him.117  
 
It is submitted that the current position, especially in the light of FirstRand Bank v 
Evans, vitiates the effectiveness of the entire consumer debt relief system introduced 
by the NCA.118 It may thwart debtors' bona fides and genuine efforts to access the 
formal statutory debt relief mechanisms, and it may also tend to encourage the 
abuse of process by creditors who wish to circumvent the NCA's requirements for 
the enforcement of debts arising out of credit agreements.119 However, of even 
greater concern is the possibility that the consumer debt relief system and 
procedure, including the provision for the sequestration of insolvent estates in terms 
of the Insolvency Act and for debt review and debt restructuring measures in terms 
of the NCA, do not conform to internationally recognised principles and 
recommendations in relation to rehabilitation procedures as alternatives to liquidation 
procedures.120 It may be noted that internationally a more debtor-orientated 
approach is advocated.121 Significantly, in the formulation of the principles that 
underlie the resolution of consumer debt problems the recently published INSOL 
International Consumer Debt Report II states:122 
 
                                            
116  FirstRand Bank Ltd v Evans para 7. Boraine and Van Heerden 2010 PELJ 120 cite this as one of 
the situations where they would anticipate that a creditor might wish to apply for the 
sequestration of a debtor's estate after a debt re-arrangement order has been issued.  
117  A similar observation may be made in relation to administration under s 74 of the Magistrates' 
Courts Act. However, the differences between s 74 of the Magistrates' Courts Act and the debt 
review and debt re-arrangement provisions in the NCA, as emphasised by Goosen J in FirstRand 
Bank v Janse van Rensburg paras 19-28, should be borne in mind.    
118  A similar view was expressed by Kupiso 2011 De Rebus 26. See also the remarks by Otto and 
Otto National Credit Act Explained 134, referred to at n 108 above. 
119  See Boraine and Van Heerden 2010 PELJ 117. 
120  See INSOL International Consumer Debt Report II 1-24. 
121  See INSOL International Consumer Debt Report II; Evans 2010 CILSA 337; Van Heerden and 
Boraine 2009 PELJ 53; Calitz 2007 Obiter 397; Roestoff and Renke 2005 Obiter 561; Roestoff 
and Renke 2006 Obiter 98. 
122  INSOL International Consumer Debt Report II 10-11. 
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… [F]or effective help to be made available to the consumer debtor, it should not be 
structured solely by way of discharge through bankruptcy proceedings, which will be 
mainly court-driven procedures requiring the involvement of a [sic] insolvency 
representative or administrator. … 
 
Help should also be directed at both finding a solution for the adverse financial 
situation and, as far as possible, preventing the debtor from getting into debt again. 
This may also require an out-of-court or extra-judicial approach and the involvement 
of a debt counsellor, a consumer advisory bureau or a social worker. 
 
Notably, as part of the "first principle" established in the INSOL International 
Consumer Debt Report II it is recommended that a debtor should be free to choose 
between a liquidation procedure and a rehabilitation procedure.123 A rehabilitation 
procedure is defined as one which "is designed to give the consumer debtor time to 
recover from temporary or more permanent liquidity difficulties and provide a way, 
through debt counseling or debt-restructuring, to reorganize his financial affairs." It is 
also recommended that upon the successful completion of the procedure "the debtor 
will obtain discharge or prepare a rehabilitation plan, composition or scheme of 
arrangement which is typically required to be approved by a majority of the creditors 
… and … by the court".124 Forming part of the "first principle" is also the 
recommendation that:125 
 
Creditors should be prohibited from pursuing the debtor during the insolvency 
process. If this were otherwise, creditors who chose not to be bound by the process 
would prevail over those utilizing the collective mechanism.  
 
In addition the law should take into account the issues that are generally provided for 
in any insolvency law. In this respect reference is made to provisions regarding the 
handling of encumbered assets and the position of secured creditors, treatment of 
contracts … and the priority of distribution. 
  
It is submitted that by the phrase "insolvency process", which is to be found in this 
"first principle", is meant the consumer debt relief process, which includes both 
liquidation and rehabilitation procedures. It may be observed that, as illustrated by 
                                            
123  INSOL International Consumer Debt Report II 16. 
124  INSOL International Consumer Debt Report II 12. 
125  INSOL International Consumer Debt Report II 17. 
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cases such as Investec v Mutemeri, Naidoo v ABSA, FirstRand Bank v Evans and 
Ex parte Ford, the South African consumer debt relief mechanisms clearly do not 
conform to these recommendations in at least the following respects. 
 According to FirstRand Bank v Evans and Ex parte Ford, a debtor is not free 
to choose between the liquidation process provided for by sequestration in terms of 
the Insolvency Act and the "rehabilitation procedure" posed by the debt review and 
debt restructuring provided for by the NCA. 
 No discharge from liability is available to the debtor who undergoes the NCA's 
"rehabilitation procedure". 
 The effect of Investec v Mutemeri, Naidoo v ABSA and FirstRand Bank v 
Evans is that a creditor who chooses not to be bound by the NCA's process is 
entitled to "pursue" the debtor during such a process by applying for and obtaining 
an order for the sequestration of the debtor's estate. Therefore, the creditor who 
insists on sequestration "prevail[s] over those utilizing the collective mechanism" 
provided for by the NCA. 
  In the "rehabilitation procedure" afforded by the NCA, when a magistrate's 
court issues a debt restructuring order it has the power in effect to override or 
overlook "provisions regarding the handling of encumbered assets and the position 
of secured creditors, treatment of contracts … and the priority of distribution" in that it 
can restructure obligations between the debtor and even a secured creditor such as 
a mortgagee of the debtor's home without the secured creditor's specific agreement 
on the restructured terms.126 The resultant restructured payment terms may be 
unsatisfactory or even untenable from the perspective of the mortgagee.  
   
For years academic commentators have pointed out that the South African 
insolvency regime does not provide for an effective, easily accessible, consumer 
debt relief mechanism as an alternative to the sequestration process currently 
available in terms of the Insolvency Act, which entails the liquidation of assets.127 
Strong calls have been made for the requirement of the advantage of creditors not to 
apply invariably, thus denying debtors who are "too poor" the opportunity to benefit 
                                            
126  This is referred to in American parlance as "cram down"; see Ferriell and Janger Understanding 
Bankruptcy 654-657.  
127  See, for example, Boraine and Roestoff 1993 De Jure 229; Boraine and Roestoff 1994 De Jure 
31; Evans 2001 SA Merc LJ 485; Boraine 2003 De Jure 217; Calitz 2007 Obiter 414; Boraine 
and Roestoff 2002 Int Insolv Rev 1.  
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by relief from the burden of debt which the Insolvency Act provides through 
rehabilitation.128 Commentators have emphasised the need for a consumer debt 
relief measure that balances the interests of debtors and creditors and society 
generally. This they envisage through the re-arrangement of debts so that they are 
payable over a reasonable, limited period and culminating in a measure of discharge 
from liability in accordance with a policy of providing an "honest" consumer debtor 
with a "fresh start". This feature is universally accepted as appropriate for an 
effective consumer debt relief system.129 They have expressed the desirability of 
establishing a legislative and administrative framework that facilitates "single portal 
access" to the insolvency system.130 It is submitted that the judgments in Ex parte 
Ford, Investec v Mutemeri, Naidoo v ABSA, FirstRand Bank v Evans and FirstRand 
Bank v Janse van Rensburg illustrate and tend to confirm the existence of such a 
need.  
 
It is within this context that it is submitted that more extensive legislative intervention, 
as suggested above, could include something along the lines of the reform initiative 
proposed by the South African Law Reform Commission in its report on the review of 
the law of insolvency, completed in February 2000. It proposed as a new section 74X 
of the Magistrates' Courts Act, a novel pre-liquidation composition procedure.131 This 
proposal came to nought, but a similar provision has been included as section 118 of 
an unofficial working draft of a proposed Insolvency and Business Recovery Bill 
compiled in 2010.132 It is submitted that this proposed pre-liquidation composition 
procedure, suitably revised and modified, has the potential to provide the type of 
                                            
128  Boraine and Roestoff 2002 Int Insolv Rev 11; Evans 2001 SA Merc LJ 508, referred to by Van 
Heerden and Boraine 2009 PELJ 161; Evans 2010 SA Merc LJ 483; Evans 2011 PELJ 39 52. 
129  See, in this regard, INSOL International Consumer Debt Report II 9-11, 15, 20-21; INSOL 
International Consumer Debt Report; McKenzie Skene 2010 Int Insolv Rev 29; McKenzie Skene 
2005 Int Insolv Rev 1 14; Van Apeldoorn 2008 Int Insolv Rev 57; Calitz 2007 Obiter 414; Van 
Heerden and Boraine 2009 PELJ 58.  
130  See Calitz 2007 Obiter 414, with reference to Boraine 2003 De Jure 217. See also, for example, 
Boraine and Roestoff 2000 Obiter 267; Van Heerden and Boraine 2009 PELJ 59. 
131  For a discussion of the proposed s 74X as an alternative to sequestration, see Boraine and 
Roestoff 2002 Int Insolv Rev 8-11. It may be noted that at the time it published its report the 
South African Law Reform Commission was called the South African Law Commission. 
However, in this article it will be referred to by its current name.   
132  An unofficial working copy is on file with the author and is available, upon request, from Mr MB 
(Tienie) Cronje (mcronje@justice.gov.za), researcher at the Department of Justice and 
Constitutional Development (Department of Justice and Constitutional Development Unofficial 
working draft). 
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debt relief mechanism that commentators have been calling for.133 It may provide an 
answer for over-indebted consumer debtors who have at least some regular income 
with which they may service their debt, even if this must occur over a longer period 
than that originally contracted. In terms of the proposed section 118, the claims of 
secured and preferent creditors remain unaffected, unless they consent in writing to 
an amendment of their obligations, but a debtor may have his debts to concurrent 
creditors restructured and made payable by lower regular instalments over a longer 
period. At the end of the repayment period, the debtor stands to benefit by a 
measure of discharge from liability. It may be noted that these features are 
universally accepted as appropriate for an effective consumer debt system.134 
Further, it is submitted that with secured and preferent creditors' claims remaining 
unaffected, the type and level of opposition to debt restructuring encountered in 
FirstRand Bank v Evans would probably not occur, as long as the terms of the 
restructuring orders are feasible. 
 
An advantage of the proposed section 118 is that it would apply in respect of all 
types of debts and not only those arising from credit agreements, as is the position in 
the NCA. This would rule out the anomaly, to which Boraine and Van Heerden as 
well as Wallis J in FirstRand Bank v Evans alluded, that would arise if it were to be 
held that a credit provider is barred from applying for the sequestration of a debtor's 
estate after the latter has applied for debt review in terms of the NCA.135  It would 
also be more useful than an administration order in terms of section 74 of the 
Magistrates' Courts Act with its limited application to cases where the total debt does 
not exceed an amount of R50 000 and its exclusion of in futuro debts.136 Further, the 
fact that the section 118 pre-liquidation composition procedure is located in proposed 
insolvency legislation would have the advantage that an appropriately modified 
provision could allow the court to determine within the framework of a single 
insolvency statute whether the composition process or the liquidation process is 
more appropriate, depending on the particular circumstances of the case. Provision 
could also be made for the simple, streamlined conversion between the two 
                                            
133  Aspects of s 118 of the working draft of a proposed Insolvency and Business Recovery Bill were 
highlighted by Coetzee "Personal bankruptcy and alternative measures".  
134  See works cited at n 121, n 127, n 128 and n 129 above.  
135  See Boraine and Van Heerden 2010 PELJ 118; FirstRand Bank Ltd v Evans para 25. See also n 
55 above.    
136  See Boraine 2003 De Jure 217. 
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processes where appropriate.137 The need for this might arise, for instance, where 
the debtor fails to comply with the terms of the composition. Thus, the single 
insolvency statute in which the composition procedure and the liquidation procedure 
would both operate could explicitly state the relationship between them.  
 
It may be noted that the South African Law Reform Commission's original proposal, 
in February 2000, incorporated a proposed section 74X(16) of the Magistrates' 
Courts Act in terms of which, where a debtor's offer of composition was rejected by 
creditors, the debtor could opt to have his estate liquidated in terms of the Insolvency 
Act.138 This part of the provision does not appear in section 118 of the unofficial 
working draft of a proposed Insolvency and Business Recovery Bill, presumably 
because of of criticisms levelled at its potential for encouraging an abuse of the 
process by debtors.139 It is submitted that the omitted text, suitably modified to 
counter this potential effect, might be considered for re-incorporation in the proposed 
section 118 to provide for convenient mobility between the composition and 
liquidation procedures at the instance of either the debtor or a creditor where 
circumstances require such mobility. Further, currently the proposed section 118(23) 
provides that between the date of determination of a date for a hearing and the 
conclusion of the hearing the creditors may not institute any action against the debtor 
or apply for the liquidation of the debtor's estate without the permission of the court. 
Section 118(19) provides for the revocation of the composition by the court in certain 
circumstances, such as where the debtor has failed to comply with its obligations. 
Presumably in such circumstances the estate of the debtor may thereafter be 
liquidated. However, these are details that would need to be specifically considered 
in the formulation of a new, appropriately devised and worded provision in the 
applicable insolvency legislation.   
 
  
                                            
137  See the proposed s 74X(16) of the Magistrates' Courts Act contained in the Report on the 
Review of the Law of Insolvency (February 2000). See also par 124.1 of the Explanatory 
Memorandum to the Draft Insolvency Bill (February 2000) (SALRC 2000 www.justice.gov.za). 
The South African Law Reform Commission's report refers to Roestoff and Jacobs 1997 De Jure 
189. 
138  See s 74X(16) of the Draft Insolvency Bill (SALRC 2000 www.justice.gov.za).    
139  See Boraine and Roestoff 2002 Int Insolv Rev 9. 
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7 Conclusion 
 
Nedbank v Andrews, FirstRand Bank v Evans and FirstRand Bank v Janse van 
Rensburg all concerned applications for the sequestration of the estates of debtors 
who had applied for debt review in terms of the NCA. These judgments follow the 
precedent established in Investec v Mutemeri and Naidoo v ABSA, that where a 
debtor has applied for debt review in terms of the NCA this does not preclude a 
creditor from applying for the sequestration of that debtor's estate. Nedbank v 
Andrews, FirstRand Bank v Evans and FirstRand Bank v Janse van Rensburg 
highlight new aspects of the interaction and interrelationship between the provisions 
of the NCA and the Insolvency Act that need to be addressed and resolved. These 
cases concerned more specifically the issue of whether an application by a debtor 
for debt review or a debt re-arrangement order by the magistrate's court in terms of 
the NCA may constitute the very act of insolvency upon which a creditor seeks to 
rely in an application for the sequestration of that debtor's estate. 
 
The judgments in Nedbank v Andrews, FirstRand Bank v Evans and FirstRand Bank 
v Janse van Rensburg reveal a measure of uncertainty regarding the position. In 
Nedbank v Andrews the applicant creditor initially relied on the debtor's application 
for debt review in terms of the NCA as constituting acts of insolvency in terms of 
sections 8(e) and 8(g) of the Insolvency Act. However, when the matter came before 
the court, counsel for the applicant withdrew these allegations and based the 
application solely on an allegation of the respondent's actual insolvency. Thus, 
remarks made by Nepgen J with regard to the commission of acts of insolvency in 
this context were obiter. In FirstRand Bank v Evans, the court regarded the debtor, 
who had required the creditor in writing to cancel the debit order that he had 
originally authorised because he had applied for debt review, as having committed 
an act of insolvency in terms of section 8(g) of the Insolvency Act. The respondent 
claimed that he had been making regular payments in accordance with a court-
sanctioned debt restructuring order and he had reduced substantially his 
indebtedness to the applicant creditor by the transfer to it of the proceeds of the sale 
of one of the mortgaged properties. However, in spite of this the court was not 
prepared to exercise its discretion against the issue of a provisional sequestration 
order. In FirstRand Bank v Janse van Rensburg, the court was not prepared to apply 
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inferential reasoning in the circumstances to find that a credit bureau's report 
reflecting that the respondent had applied for debt review amounted to an act of 
insolvency in terms of section 8(g) of the Insolvency Act. The court also indicated the 
existence of qualifications to and, it is submitted, in effect cast doubt on aspects of 
the reasoning behind the decision in FirstRand Bank v Evans. These included the 
issues of whether an application for debt review ipso facto constitutes an act of 
insolvency in terms of section 8(g) of the Insolvency Act and whether precedent 
concerning applications for administration orders in terms of section 74 of the 
Magistrates' Courts Act are applicable in this context. The decisions leave open the 
question of whether or not a debtor's application for debt review ipso facto 
constitutes an act of insolvency in terms of section 8(e) of the Insolvency Act. 
 
It is submitted that the current position, especially in the light of FirstRand Bank v 
Evans, undermines the potential for the consumer debt relief system introduced by 
the NCA to serve as an alternative to sequestration. It also potentially encourages 
the abuse of the process by creditors who may wish to circumvent the NCA's 
requirements for the enforcement of debts arising out of credit agreements by simply 
applying for the sequestration of the debtor's estate. It is submitted that this state of 
affairs and, more particularly, the judgment in FirstRand Bank v Evans indicate the 
need, on a practical level, for solutions to be found in order to combat or at least 
reduce credit grantors' opposition or resistance to debt review and debt restructuring 
under the NCA. It is imperative that debt restructuring orders should be viable in that 
they provide for debtors' obligations to be fulfilled on terms that are reasonable both 
in respect of instalment amounts and time periods for payment as well as taking into 
account the original payment terms contracted for and prevailing interest rates.  
 
It has been submitted by a commentator that certain sections of the NCA should be 
amended in order to clarify the relationship between the NCA and the Insolvency Act 
to preclude the bringing of an application for the sequestration of a debtor's estate 
once he has applied for debt review and after a debt restructuring order has been 
issued. This would indeed be a valid consideration. However, it is of great concern 
that the consumer debt relief system and procedure, including the debt review and 
debt restructuring processes, provided for by the NCA do not conform to 
internationally recognised principles and recommendations in relation to 
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rehabilitation procedures as alternatives to liquidation procedures. For example, 
according to the "first principle" established in the INSOL International Consumer 
Debt Report II, it is recommended that a debtor should be free to choose between a 
liquidation procedure and a rehabilitation procedure, the latter including a debt 
restructuring procedure. Further, on successful completion of such a rehabilitation 
procedure the debtor should receive a measure of discharge from liability that has 
been approved by a majority of creditors. In addition, the INSOL International 
Consumer Debt Report II recommends that creditors should be "prohibited from 
pursuing the debtor during the insolvency process" or "collective mechanism" and it 
anticipates that the claims of secured and preferent creditors will not be affected.  
 
In the circumstances, it is submitted that legislative intervention is required. It is 
submitted that consideration should be given to modifying section 118 of the 
unofficial working draft of a proposed Insolvency and Business Recovery Bill which 
was compiled in 2010, with a view to devising a streamlined system of debt relief 
accessible via a single insolvency statute. This system should include liquidation and 
debt restructuring processes variously applicable depending on the circumstances of 
each case. It should cover not only debt arising out of credit agreements but all types 
of obligations and it should respect the rights of secured creditors. It is submitted that 
in this way a more effective balance may be achieved between the interests of 
debtors and creditors in the consumer debt relief systems and processes available in 
South Africa. 
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